At the G20 New Delhi Summit, the leaders of key economies agreed that “headwinds to global economic growth and stability persist” and shared concerns of a potential global economic slowdown. The BoJ seems to be maintaining the view that “there are extremely high uncertainties for Japan's economic activity and prices, including developments in overseas economic activity and prices, developments in commodity prices, and domestic firms' wage- and price-setting behavior”.

In order to pull Japan completely out of deflation, the BoJ seems ready to be one policy cycle behind key central banks in starting the normalisation process.

We expect the government to maintain its commitment to the current accommodative fiscal/monetary policy framework even after the PM Fumio Kishida reshuffles the cabinet and LDP leadership. The government will likely maintain its accommodative fiscal policy stance under the banner of “new capitalism” to further stimulate investments and in turn economic growth.

With the government maintaining a strong commitment to the Abenomics policy framework, the BoJ will likely remain cautious of any major policy changes in order to not repeat past mistakes of premature policy tightening. On the other hand, the risk scenario is if the global economy remains resilient and markets stop pricing policy rate cuts by key central banks next year, the BoJ could start the normalisation process in 2024 under the assumption that the global economy will continue to remain strong.

At the G20 New Delhi Summit, the leaders of key economies agreed that “headwinds to global economic growth and stability persist” and shared concerns of a potential global economic slowdown. The BoJ seems to be maintaining the view that “there are extremely high uncertainties for Japan's economic activity and prices, including developments in overseas economic activity and prices, developments in commodity prices, and domestic firms' wage- and price-setting behavior”. In order to pull Japan completely out of deflation, the BoJ seems ready to be one policy cycle behind key central banks in starting the normalisation process.

As long as markets are pricing in a Fed rate cut sometime next year, the BoJ will likely continue with the current monetary easing policies. We continue to expect the BoJ will likely start the normalisation process by exiting from the YCC framework in 2025, once the global economy enters the next cyclical recovery.

Meanwhile, we expect the government to maintain its commitment to the current accommodative fiscal/monetary policy framework even after the PM Fumio Kishida reshuffles the cabinet and LDP leadership. The government will likely maintain its accommodative fiscal policy stance under the banner of “new capitalism” to further stimulate investments and in turn economic growth. With many key ministers having experienced posts within METI, the government’s fiscal policy stance will likely focus on stimulating the economy rather than balancing the budget. With the government maintaining a strong commitment to the Abenomics policy framework, the BoJ will likely remain cautious of any major policy changes in order to not repeat past mistakes of premature policy tightening.

On the other hand, the risk scenario is if the global economy remains resilient and markets stop pricing policy rate cuts by key central banks next year, the BoJ could start the normalisation process in 2024 under the assumption that the global economy will continue to remain strong.

The main scenario is that the central bank policy tightening cycle is approaching its end and the global economy will show stronger signs of slowing down as the cumulative effects of policy rate hikes so far suppress demand and dampen inflationary pressures. An economic slowdown and expectations for interest rate cuts by key central banks including the Fed will likely strengthen downward pressure on global bond yields and give the BoJ room to reduce its JGB purchases while maintaining the current YCC framework.

Based on the latest US financial accounts, the household savings rate (net asset change as percentage of GDP) seems to have bottomed out at around 2.2% of GDP in Q422, and has increased since then to 4.4% as of Q223. The household savings rate rising again combined with economic data showing signs of weakness and weaker inflationary pressures is likely the basis in which many market participants continue to see a soft-landing scenario as their main scenario.

The upside risk scenario is that the global economy remains resilient and inflationary pressures remain. Under such a scenario, central banks will be forced to continue tightening monetary policy and market expectations of a policy rate cut in 2024 would disappear. In such a scenario, upward pressure on JGB yields would strengthen and the JPY would weaken further. The BoJ will likely be forced to adjust or abandon YCC in such a scenario. However, to finance the continued increase of consumption activities, households will be forced to sell assets which will likely lead to a peak in asset prices. Combined with higher policy rates, the economy could face strong headwinds in such a scenario and an upside risk scenario could be followed by a hard landing scenario

The downside risk scenario is that the effect of cumulative rate hikes by central banks so far appears much stronger than anticipated. Under such a scenario, businesses will likely strengthen their cautious attitudes and lead to a much stronger-than-expected deleveraging move. Central banks will likely be forced to respond by cutting policy rates at a much faster pace than anticipated. In such a world, the JPY would likely appreciate significantly and the risk that Japan falls back into deflation will likely strengthen. The BoJ will likely be forced to respond by implementing additional easing measures, such as further cuts to its negative interest rate policy, while implementing measures to alleviate the side effects of further easing policies simultaneously. Under such a scenario, the global economy could fall back into a deflationary state but we believe the likelihood of such a scenario materialising at this juncture remains small