Diverging Inflation: Goods vs Services in the Eurozone and the ECB's Challenge
ING Economics 13.06.2023 13:07
History is one thing, the present another. Digging into the details of current core inflation in the eurozone shows a significant divergence between goods and services, regarding both economic activity and selling price expectations. Judging from the latest sentiment indicators, demand for goods has been weakening for quite some time already. At the same time, easing supply chain frictions and lower energy and transport costs have taken away price pressures, leading to a dramatic decline in the number of businesses in the manufacturing sector that intend to raise prices in the months ahead.
The services sector, however, is still thriving, enjoying the post-pandemic shift from goods to services. Services most affected by lockdowns are currently experiencing much faster price growth than other services or goods. The upcoming summer holiday period could still fuel service price inflation.
Core inflation has been falling recently, but services inflation has been subdued by German public transport tickets
Still, a key question remains over how long the divergence between goods and services inflation can last. Historically, we don’t see much evidence of a significant difference between the two. Goods inflation actually leads services inflation by approximately six months, which means that the peak for goods from February historically suggests that services inflation is unlikely to remain elevated for the rest of the year. If we are right and the post-pandemic shift ends after the summer holiday period, we could see services inflation starting to come down before the end of the year.
Goods inflation historically leads services inflation by six months
Overall, core inflation seems set to trend down from here on
While services inflation continues to see some upside risk for the months ahead, core inflation overall looks set to trend down on the back of slowing goods prices. Even services inflation could already be trending down, but perhaps not as fast as policymakers would like. When looking at selling price expectations for sectors that sell most to consumers, we see that there has been a steady downturn in the number of businesses intending to raise prices. This generally correlates fairly well with core inflation developments seven months later, which would point to a significant slowdown in core inflation.
At the current juncture, experts and central bankers will be hesitant to make an outright call for a sharp drop in inflation. The latest track record of inflation forecasting is simply not on their (or our) side. Nevertheless, as much as it was once obvious that the era of low inflation had to end at some point, it's now clear that the short period of surging inflation will also cease sooner or later. Historical evidence and the latest developments in both goods and services give enough comfort to expect both headline and core inflation to decline.
We currently expect core inflation to drop below 4% at the end of the year, and for it to be at 2.5% by mid-2024. The risks to that outlook seem to be fairly balanced, as stubborn core inflation on the back of faster wage growth and a quicker drop on the back of weak goods inflation remain decent possibilities.
Business expectations point to moderating core inflation over the second half of the year
Could the ECB fall behind the curve again?
For the ECB, this isn't to say that tightening is over. In fact, the central bank can't – and won't – take a chance on this kind of core inflation forecast. Why? Because they've simply been wrong too often in previous years. To put it into ECB language: inflation forecasts are currently surrounded by an unprecedented amount of uncertainty. This is one of the reasons why the central bank has put more emphasis on current inflation developments and less emphasis on its own inflation forecasts for one or two years ahead.
While such a strategy supports the ECB’s credibility, by definition it runs the risk of falling behind the curve. Given the time lags with which monetary policy operates and affects the economy, central banks should be forward-looking, not now-looking. This is the theory. In practice, however, the ECB will not change its tightening stance until core inflation shows clear signs of a turning point. Taking all of the above into consideration, this implies that it will not only hike at this week’s meeting but could continue to do so at least until September – at the risk, by that point, of having gone too far.