Center Of Eastern Studies

The Ukrainian authorities warn that continued Russian destruction of energy infrastructure will lead to increasingly frequent blackouts. On 5 November, Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko said that the capital, now home to around 3 million people (350,000 are internally displaced), could run out of electricity, heating and water. He appealed to residents to consider moving outside temporarily to buildings with an independent heating source and water intake. A day later, mayoral officials did not rule out evacuating the city if there was a total loss of the power system. On the same day, President Volodymyr Zelensky declared that more than 4.5 million energy consumers – mainly in Kyiv and its surroundings – had been disconnected from power. On 7 November, planned and emergency power cuts began in seven oblasts – Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Kharkiv and Poltava – and the capital from the morning. The latest Russian missile and drone attacks have focused on energy and industrial infrastructure in cities on the back of Ukrainian defences. There was damage to facilities in the Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia and eastern Vilniansk, as well as Kramatorsk and Pokrovsk in the Donetsk Oblast. Both sides continued to shell and bombard enemy positions along the line of contact, with border regions of Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts also targeted by the invaders. According to Pentagon assessments, the Ukrainian army fired 4,000–7,000 artillery rounds daily, while the Russians fired nearly 20,000. After a few days of reduced activity in the northeastern part of the Donetsk Oblast, aggressor forces have again increased the frequency of attacks. The defenders repulsed assaults on Bakhmut and the surrounding villages and the Russians’ subsequent attempts to break through towards Siversk and north of Horlivka. The Russians have not ceased their attacks north and west of Donetsk and south and east of Vuhledar. They have also made attempts to attack Ukrainian positions east of Lyman. There were also isolated attacks in the Kharkiv Oblast bordering the Russian Federation and south of Zaporizhzhia for the first time in many months. Ukrainian units, in turn, were to make further attempts to break through enemy positions on the border of the Kharkiv Oblast and north of Kherson. The Russians would continue to expand defensive positions in the Kherson Oblast on both sides of the Dnieper, on whose right bank they were to leave 20,000–25,000 troops. Read full article on OSW.WAW.PL

On 10 October, the leader of the Belarusian opposition Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya proposed to President Volodymyr Zelensky that an alliance be formed between Ukraine and a free & democratic Belarus – i.e. the interim cabinet formed under Tsikhanouskaya’s leadership in August this year. At the same time, she declared that Belarus should give up its political, economic and military alliance with Russia, and that Ukraine would win its war against the Russian aggressor. So far, the offer has not met with a high-level reaction from Kyiv. On 12 October Oleksiy Arestovych, an advisor to the Ukrainian presidential office, reacted positively to the Belarusian opposition leader’s appeal, while at the same time criticising the Ukrainian political class for “unfairly” holding Belarusians responsible for the pro-Russian policy of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. However the chairman of the Ukrainian parliament’s foreign affairs committee and member of the Servant of the Nation party Oleksandr Merezhko, together with another deputy from the same party Bohdan Yaremenko, stated that Ukraine could not recognise Tsikhanouskaya and her cabinet because the stance of the Belarusian opposition towards Russia remains unclear (including its failure to condemn Russia as a terrorist state); they also questioned the credibility of “certain people within her entourage”. Read full article on OSW.WAW.PL

On 11 October, German Interior Minister Nancy Faeser (SPD), in a meeting with representatives of the states and local authorities, announced support for municipalities to accommodate more refugees during the winter. The aid will consist of increasing the number of places made available to them by the federal offices – up to a total of 68,000 (up from the 64,000 so far guaranteed in 300 federal properties). In addition, the German government will extend the random checks (introduced in 2015) at the border with Austria and intensify those along the border with the Czech Republic. The meeting was called in response to appeals from local authorities, who have been warning for several weeks that the situation in numerous refugee centres is making it impossible to take in any more people. Local authorities are therefore renting additional spaces such as sports halls, hotels and market facilities, which is reminiscent of the actions of 2015 and 2016. In a letter to Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) at the beginning of October, municipal unions demanded that the influx of asylum seekers be restricted, indicating that they would not be able to cope with another refugee crisis similar to the one in 2015. Some municipalities, especially in eastern Germany (including Dresden, Gera, Halle), have stopped accepting refugees, including from Ukraine. Read full article on osw.waw.pl

On 10 October, Russia launched massive missile and drone attacks across Ukraine. A total of 84 rockets (43 of which were shot down) and 24 drones (13 shot down) were launched. 19 people were killed and 105 were wounded. The main targets were critical infrastructure facilities (power plants, thermal power plants and substations) in 11 regions and the capital. Among those damaged were the Burshtyn (Ivano-Frankivsk region) and Trypilska (Kyiv region) power plants, as well as thermal power plants in Kyiv, Lviv and Kharkiv. As a result, there was a power outage in most localities both in the east of the country (Kharkiv, Sumy and Poltava regions) and in the western part of the country (Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk regions). The attacks not only involved energy-related infrastructure–buildings and streets in the centre of Kyiv were also shelled. Ukrenergo (the grid operator) decided to impose emergency power outages (including in the capital), and the government urged people to limit their electricity consumption between 5 and 10 pm. Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko announced the suspension of electricity exports from 11 October in order to stabilise the voltage on Ukrainian grids. Russian attacks continued on 11 October, hitting, among others, the Ladyzhyn power plant (Vinnytsia region) and two power facilities in Lviv. Read more on OSW.WAW.PL

On 11 July, in line with previous announcements and annual practice, Gazprom stopped gas deliveries to European customers via the Nord Stream 1 (NS1) pipeline, which runs from Russia to Germany along the Baltic Sea bed. Although the supply interruption is thought to be of a technical nature (related to planned maintenance work), a number of European commentators and officials (including Germany’s Economy Minister Robert Habeck, France’s Economy and Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire and European Commission Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis) are concerned that supplies will not be fully or even partly restored once the interruption ends (21 July). Already in June, Gazprom reduced gas supplies via NS1 (from 167 million m3 to 66 million m3 per day), citing one of the reasons being problems related to the sanctions-related blockage in Canada of Siemens gas turbines for the compressor station being repaired there. Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov rejected accusations levelled at Moscow that the decisions were political, and indicated (on 8 July) that the return of the turbine would help boost supplies after the technical break. On 10 July, Canada’s Energy Minister Jonathan Wilkinson announced that the government would allow an exception to the country’s sanctions and grant temporary, revocable approval for the delivery to Germany of Siemens gas turbines that are being repaired in a Siemens subsidiary in Montreal, to be later delivered to Russia’s Gazprom. According to media leaks (published in the Canadian daily The Globe and Mail on 13 July), the approval is to last for two years and applies to six turbines. The Canadian decision was criticised by the Ukrainian authorities, including President Volodymyr Zelensky. On the same day, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry conveyed its protest in a verbal note to the Canadian ambassador in Kyiv. Also, Ukraine’s energy and interior ministries called on the Canadian parliament to halt the return of the turbine, arguing that otherwise Moscow would gain support in its hybrid war against Europe. The statement stressed that the Russian side is not taking advantage of existing opportunities to increase gas supplies through Ukrainian territory. On 10 July, the Canadian government’s decision was welcomed by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. On 11 July it was also supported by the US State Department. In doing so, it stated that its implementation would allow Germany and other European countries to replenish their gas stocks and protect themselves from Russian energy blackmail. On the same day, a spokesperson for the German government stated that the German side had taken note of the critical position of the Ukrainian authorities regarding the return of the turbine, and stressed that EU sanctions do not cover equipment related to the supply of natural gas. A spokesperson for the European Commission gave a similar assessment. On 8 July, during a meeting with members of the government on the fuel and energy industry, President Vladimir Putin called on the cabinet and Russian energy companies to prepare for a Western embargo on imports of Russian energy and to intensify efforts to diversify its exports to the South and East. On 11 July, the Krasnodar Krai court in Rostov-on-Don, following an appeal by the KTK/CPC consortium (the operator of the oil pipeline from the Kazakh Tengiz field to the Russian terminal in Novorossiysk), amended the Novorossiysk district court’s order of 5 July and replaced the suspension of the company’s activities for 30 days for environmental violations (and consequently the operation of the oil pipeline) with a fine of 200,000 roubles (currently equivalent to approximately $3,300). On 13 July, the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) monthly report was published, showing, among other things, that Russian crude oil production increased by 490,000 barrels per day (b/d) in June – to 11.07 million b/d. Crude exports decreased in June to 7.4 million b/d, down 250,000 b/d from May this year. (Crude oil accounted for about 5 million b/d of this and oil products, whose export volume remained unchanged, accounted for about 2.4 million b/d). At the same time, Russia’s oil export revenues increased by $700m in June compared to May and exceeded $20bn per month. This was due to an increase in the average price of Urals crude oil, which in June (according to the Russian Ministry of Finance) stood at $87.25 per barrel, 10.7% higher than in May this year. On 13 July, credit rating agency Moody’s reported that Germany’s plan to reduce its share of natural gas imports from Russia to 10% by 2024 will be very challenging (despite having already managed to reduce this percentage from 60% to 35% in April this year). Italy, on the other hand, could become completely independent of Russian gas imports by 2025. According to the agency’s assessments, the possible suspension of gas supplies by Russia via NS1 and the resulting problems would cause losses estimated at 3–6% of Germany’s GDP and 1–3% of Italy’s GDP. Read full article on: Stopping the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline (osw.waw.pl)

Fighting continues for the Azot plant, the last point of Ukrainian resistance in Sievierodonetsk. The defenders are repelling Russian attacks on the southern outskirts of the city (Syrotyne), on both sides of the road connecting Hirske with Lysychansk (the villages of Myrna Dolyna and Bila Hora), south-east of Bakhmut and north of Sloviansk (near the villages of Bohorodychne and Dolyna). The aggressor forces continue their assault ‘along the Lysychansk–Bakhmut road’. After a break of several days, they resumed offensive operations west of Donetsk (they were repulsed near Marinka) and – after an operational pause of almost two months – southeast of Kharkiv (they carried out battle reconnaissance in the area of Rtyshchivka). They also completed the construction of a makeshift railway bridge over the Donetsk River near Kupiansk on the main supply line for troops in the Izyum area. Russian artillery and aviation continued to strike Ukrainian positions and hinterland along the lines of troop contact. Outside the Donbas, their targets were mainly Kharkiv and Mykolaiv with surrounding towns and areas around the town of Zelenodolsk south of Kryvyi Rih. Less intense shelling was reported southeast of Zaporizhzhia and in the border areas of the Sumy Oblast. Another day, rockets fell on Ochakiv, Odesa and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi. For the first time, the Ukrainian side reported an enemy rocket strike in the Danube estuary. In turn, according to Russian reports, enemy forces carried out a rocket attack on two Chornomornaftohaz oil platforms (seized by the Russians in 2014) 70 km from Odesa. Read more on Russia’s attack on Ukraine: day 117 (osw.waw.pl)

Georgia’s reaction to the war in Ukraine can be called ambivalent. Although Tbilisi condemned the aggression, it has not joined the anti-Russian sanctions. Indeed, according to Kyiv, Georgia has been violating them and allowing Russia to circumvent them, although so far there is no hard evidence of this. Georgia’s stance of ‘benevolent neutrality’ towards the aggressor may be partly explained by the fear of a Russian threat; objectively, however, this stance means de facto support for Moscow. In the context of the cooling of relations between Georgia and the West (i.e. the EU & US) observed over the last few years, this raises the question of whether Tbilisi is not carrying out a creeping reorientation of its foreign policy from pro-Western to pro-Russian – something which the Georgian opposition has accused the government of doing. It seems that although at the moment there is no question of a deliberate geopolitical shift, the drift towards Moscow is setting a new tone, and it is becoming increasingly inconvenient for Washington and Brussels to support Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. On the rhetorical level, Tbilisi’s main priority is still accession to the EU and NATO: in early March Georgia applied for EU membership, together with Ukraine and Moldova. It should be assumed that the Georgian government is being guided by an extreme pragmatism, which in many cases takes the form of open cynicism. The Georgian Dream party, which has been ruling the country since 2012, does not want to bear the social or political costs of reforms (which would risk it losing power), as it realises that integration with the institutional West is not very realistic in the foreseeable future. Cooperating with internationally isolated Russia may bring specific benefits for Tbilisi and is in line with the expectations of the Georgian public, which on the one hand is mostly supportive of Euro-Atlantic integration, while on the other is afraid of Russia and favours maintaining dialogue with Moscow. For these reasons – and also due to the weakness of the opposition – a change of government in Georgia and the return to power of clearly pro-Western forces seem unlikely at present. The strong ties between the Georgian opposition (including former president Mikheil Saakashvili), and the Ukrainian government are an important cause of the cool relations between Tbilisi and Kyiv. Tbilisi’s double game In response to the Russian invasion, the president, the prime minister and the head of parliament of Georgia declared their solidarity with Ukraine: the prime minister condemned Moscow’s actions and called for de-escalation, and the president called the events a joint tragedy for Ukraine and Georgia. Despite these initial reactions (subsequent ones, especially from the prime minister, were already more subdued), Tbilisi did not join the anti-Russian sanctions announced by Western states and institutions. This was allegedly done to avoid drawing the country into an armed conflict: a scenario in which Georgia becomes the next target of a Russian attack is not implausible in the light of the experience of the war between the two countries in 2008 – and the costs for the economy (e.g. tourism), which was already weakened after the pandemic, would be too high.[1] Over the following weeks, Georgia’s attitude towards the war (and towards defending Ukraine) became even more ambivalent. On one hand, Tbilisi spoke out in favour of punishing the aggressor, showing solidarity with Kyiv. On 7 April, Georgia voted in the UN General Assembly to suspend Russia’s membership of the Human Rights Council;[2] on 5 May Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili took part in a conference of donors to Ukraine held in Warsaw, and presented data on the aid Georgia had provided;[3] and President Salome Zurabishvili has emphasised the community of fate that binds both countries in numerous speeches and interviews[4] (the president was elected with the support of the ruling Georgian Dream but is not a member of this party; her position has remained clearly pro-Ukrainian, which is why it often diverges from that of the government). It should also be mentioned that (following Ukraine) on 3 March Georgia and Moldova officially applied for EU membership. On the other, however, Tbilisi has also made a number of friendly gestures towards Russia; for example, it denied permission to take off to a charter flight which Georgian volunteers wanted to use to travel to Ukrainian territory in the first days of the war.[5] The speaker of the Georgian parliament was only able to visit Ukraine thanks to pressure from the opposition, which also sent a separate delegation itself. Georgia has regularly been accused (above all by the government in Kyiv) of violating sanctions and allowing Russia to circumvent them, although there is no convincing evidence that this is the case. Tbilisi rejects these accusations outright, and maintains that although it has not formally introduced any sanctions, it does respect the internationally accepted arrangements. In a statement from the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine at the beginning of April, it was stated that channels for transporting goods to Russia which are subject to sanctions are being established in Georgia, including military and dual-purpose items, and that “Georgian secret service officers have been instructed by the country’s political leadership not to interfere with the activities of smugglers”.[6] In response, the State Security Service of Georgia, referring to bilateral information exchange agreements, asked Kyiv to provide evidence of such a practice.[7] On 1 May, the Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence renewed the accusations, stating this time that Russia is in talks with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to re-export sanctioned Russian products to world markets via these three countries. Tbilisi has also denied this accusation: the Ukrainian chargé d’affaires was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and asked for an explanation, and the Georgian finance minister argued that re-exporting in this form was not possible due to international monitoring systems.[8] On 20 May, the head of the Ukrainian Presidential Administration, Andriy Yermak, said in an online interview organised by the Atlantic Council and published on its YouTube channel that Georgia is on the blacklist of countries that are helping Russia to bypass the sanctions. Yermak said that influential Georgian businessmen who own shares of Russian companies are involved in this, but he did not provide any specific data.[9] On one hand, it can be concluded from the frequency and gravity of the accusations made against Tbilisi that attempts to violate the sanctions regime are indeed taking place. One clue to this may be the fact that since the beginning of the Russian invasion, the number of newly registered companies in Georgia has risen by 70% (although this is probably also related to the activity of Russian and Belarusian citizens who oppose the Kremlin’s policy and have decided to settle in this country).[10] Regardless of this, Georgia is actually intensifying its economic contacts with Russia. In the first four months of 2022, imports from Russia to Georgia rose by 27% (compared to the same period in 2021; Georgian exports have fallen by 0.4%).[11] In recent years, the Georgian economy’s dependence on its northern neighbour has increased noticeably in various areas, including energy. According to a report in this March from Transparency International Georgia, in 2021, for example, over 23% of the gas Georgia imports (in 2018 it was just 2.8%) and as much as 94% of its wheat came from Russia.[12] On the other hand, some EU countries have also become dependent on Russian raw materials, and the Ukrainian accusations may be intended as a warning, portraying not so much real incidents of abuse as the potential for them to occur (it should be remembered that for Kyiv, expanding and tightening the sanctions imposed on Russia are a raison d’état). Even on this basis, however, it must be stated that the kind of double game which Georgia is playing is weakening the anti-Russian front, which in the situation of Moscow’s international isolation constitutes a de facto declaration of ‘benevolent neutrality’ towards the aggressor. This has been confirmed by the compliments Russian politicians have paid to Tbilisi.[13] Full article: Having your cake and eating it. Georgia, the war in Ukraine and integration with the West (osw.waw.pl)

At night on 30 May, the European Council managed to reach an agreement on the sixth package of sanctions against Russia. Although the details of the arrangements are yet to be made public, media reports show that the leaders of the EU Member States have agreed to impose restrictions on the import of Russian oil, with a temporary exemption for oil imported to the EU via oil pipelines (this derogation was primarily demanded by Hungary). The ban is to be introduced within six months of the EU Council decision on this matter entering into force. However, conclusions reached at the summit envisage that the European Council will address the issue of temporary derogation for oil supplied via pipeline as soon as possible. The European Council summit also saw agreement on the imposition of an embargo on the import of Russian petroleum products within eight months. The European Council also obliged the EU Council to adopt a new sanctions package without delay, ensuring a properly functioning EU single market, fair competition, solidarity among member states and a level playing field, including with regard to reducing the dependence on Russian fossil fuels. According to the announcements made by President of the European Council Charles Michel and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, the embargo on oil imports from Russia by sea will affect more than two thirds of Russian gas supplies to the EU. Representatives of the EU authorities added that, taking into account the discontinuation of oil imports by the end of 2022 announced by Poland and Germany, total oil supplies from Russia to the EU may decrease by as much as 90% by the end of the year. In addition, under the current sanctions package, three more Russian banks are to be disconnected from the Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), including the largest state-owned bank, Sberbank. According to media reports, the state-owned Rosselkhozbank (sixth in terms of assets) and the private Moscow Credit Bank (seventh) will be added to this list. Furthermore, personal sanctions will be imposed on a further 58 people, including Kirill, the Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus’, Alina Kabaeva (who is believed to be President Vladimir Putin’s former life partner) and individuals responsible for waging the war in Ukraine. In addition, three Russian TV channels are to be included in the sanctions lists. They will not be able to broadcast their signal to the territory of the EU, including via satellite. On 31 May, Gazprom suspended gas supplies to the Dutch energy company GasTerra which had refused to pay for Russian gas in rubles. Under the contract, which is valid until 1 October 2022, the company should still receive 2 billion m3 of gas. The Danish company Ørsted, which intends to pay for the Russian gas in euros on 31 May, is also preparing for supplies to be cut off. According to the agreement which is binding until 2030, the company should receive 1.8 billion m3 of gas annually from Russia. Read full article on OSW

The Ukrainian side reports an increase in the intensity of operations at the junction of the Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Lyman has been partially captured by the aggressor’s forces, which are to prepare for a further strike in the south-eastern direction – on Siversk–Bakhmut. The defenders are trying to prevent the seizure of the Lysychansk–Bakhmut road section in the Donetsk Oblast, halting the assaults in the Biolohorivka–Nahirne–Berestove area. The main Ukrainian grouping near Sievierodonetsk has been split into two parts – Lysychansk–Sievierodonetsk and Hirske–Zolote – which the enemy is trying to surround. The Russians are also advancing towards Bakhmut from the south-east (they were stopped in the area of the village of Vidrodzhennya). Attempts to break through Ukrainian defences were made in the rest of the Donetsk Oblast and, after a break of several days, on the border of the Kherson Oblast with the Mykolaiv (Tavriiske) and Dnepropetrovsk (Mykolaivka) oblasts. The air and artillery of the aggressor do not cease their attacks on the enemy positions and their hinterland in all directions. Provocation? The invaders are reconstituting a strike group in the areas bordering the Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts. Local Ukrainian sources report that, for the time being, there are no signs of preparations for an attack, but the artillery shelling of the defenders’ positions continues. The Operational Command ‘South’ draws attention to the strengthening of the enemy on Snake Island and the preparation of provocations with the use of seized units of the Ukrainian fleet. The Russian authorities have shortened the process of passportization of the population in the occupied territories. On 25 May, Vladimir Putin signed a decree on simplifying the procedure for granting Russian citizenship to Ukrainians from the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts. The document stipulates that applications by residents of these territories for its granting should be considered for no longer than three months. In Mariupol, information was disseminated about the possibility of acquiring Russian citizenship without first obtaining a passport of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, but obtaining new documents requires travel to Russia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine considered the decree illegal and grossly violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the invaded country and the norms and principles of international law. Follow FXMAG.COM on Google News Donbas The claim that the Kremlin is accelerating the annexation scenario towards Donbas is confirmed. The head of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, Denis Pushilin, admitted that once the entire Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts have been seized, a ‘referendum’ will be held on the inclusion of these areas into Russia. He added that its outcome is obvious. In occupied Mariupol, the invaders have extended the school year until 1 September and are preparing schools to implement the Russian curriculum. This is primarily aimed at indoctrinate the local youth. Throughout the summer, they will study the Russian language and Russian literature and history. The occupiers plan to open nine schools, but so far only 53 teachers have been found willing to work. Read full article on OSW

The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, has reported that the defenders have moved to the offensive in the Kharkiv and Izyum directions, where fierce fighting is ongoing. According to the collective reports of the operational commands ‘East’, Combined Forces Operations (in Donbas), ‘South’ and the Air Force Command, the Russians lost within 24 hours: an aircraft, 14 unmanned aerial vehicles, 11 tanks and 14 armoured fighting vehicles, among others. The defence of the Odesa area reported that a winged missile was shot down and a Black Sea Fleet frigate was hit.   The invaders continue to implement the ‘ruble zone’ in the occupied territories, which is intended to weaken the ties of these territories with the Ukrainian economy and create links with the so-called people’s republics and Russia. The announcement of the introduction of the ruble from 1 May has still not been realised – the hryvnia remains in circulation. In Kherson, pensions and social benefits are to continue to be paid by Ukrainian institutions. Russian soldiers, after receiving their pay, exchange roubles for hryvnias in exchange offices. In unofficial circulation, foreign currencies, above all the dollar, are gaining in importance. Difficulties in the rapid introduction of the rouble have led the occupier to announce a four-month transition period allowing payments in Ukrainian currency. During this time, it is planned to open Sbierbank outlets and introduce regulations requiring local entrepreneurs to open ruble accounts with it.   In the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, the Russians are forcing residents to fill in documents on land ownership. On presentation of these, cultivation licences will be issued. Failure to register acreage risks confiscation. Security has been tightened in some Ukrainian cities from 7–10 May as authorities anticipate that rocket fire will increase in connection with Russian Victory Day celebrations. The mayor of Ivano-Frankivsk called on the population to temporarily leave the city and not to gather in public places. In Zaporizhzhia, a stricter curfew was announced, including a ban on movement around the city.   The third stage of the UN-led evacuation of Mariupol has been completed. So far, over 500 civilians have left the city, including 200 people from the embattled Azovstal metallurgical plant. In between transports, aggressor troops are shelling the defended facility. The evacuation is expected to continue on 6 May.   In an interview with the AP news agency, Alexander Lukashenko stated that the Belarusian army would not take part in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and that everything Minsk could and can offer Moscow (logistical security of forces, the possibility of air and missile attacks from Belarusian territory) had already been done. He added that the war could be ended within a week, but this would not happen ‘because of the attitude of the United States and Britain’... read more

Russian troops continue to shell and bomb Ukrainian positions in the combat areas and their deep hinterland. Mykolaiv and Kramatorsk fell victim to a massive rocket artillery strike (multiple launch rocket systems with a range of tens of kilometres). The rocket attack damaged, among others, railway infrastructure in Cherkasy and Dnipro, as well as facilities near Brovary in the Kiev Oblast and Kropyvnytskyi. Defenders reported that some enemy rockets were shot down. Delays in the movement of dozens of passenger trains have reached several hours. The information provided by the Ukrainian side from the battle areas is increasingly enigmatic or, as in the case of the situation in the Izyum-Barvinkove-Sloviansk triangle, non-existent.   The Ukrainians point to the increasingly intensive shelling of the border areas of the Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts and the expansion of enemy groupings on the opposite side of the border. Subdivisions of the 90th Tank Division from the Central Military District (MD) are to be developed in the Kursk Oblast, while in the Gomel Oblast the aggressor is increasing the number of air defence systems. Also, the exercises of special forces and electronic warfare subunits, which began in Belarus, are presented in the context of the threat of renewed Russian activity from the north. Kiev fears an armed provocation in this border region.   After a hiatus of nearly two weeks, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine provided information on the invader’s personnel problems. Soldiers of the 38th Mechanised Brigade from the 35th Combined Arms Army (CAA) of the Eastern MD were to refuse further participation in the war. In turn, the subunits of the 2nd Army Corps (the so-called Lugansk People’s Militia) of the Southern MD, after being complemented with residents of the villages closest to the combat area, are characterised by a low moral and psychological state, have major problems with their weapons and are not ready to perform their tasks.   According to American data, two of the twelve battalion tactical groups that took part in capturing the city remained in Mariupol (they are supposed to number less than 2,000 soldiers). The remaining units were redeployed to the border of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts, in the area of Velyka Novosilka.   According to Ukrainian military intelligence, the aggressor is escalating the situation in Transnistria to create the appearance of preparing the Russian troops stationed there for an attack and to disperse and tie up the Ukrainian army in the next direction. The personnel of the Russian Army Operations Group in the Transnistrian region does not exceed 300 people, and the combined human potential of the Transnistrian and Russian forces is about 1,400 people. The territory of Transnistria may be useful for establishing supply lines for the invading troops. However, a condition for the success of this plan is the establishment of a land corridor through the southern regions of Ukraine, which, given the effective resistance of the defenders, currently seems unlikely.   The Ukrainian defence ministry has said that a covert mobilisation of unemployed and members of Cossack organisations is underway in the Belgorod and Kursk oblasts and the southern regions of Russia. Former military personnel residing in post-Soviet states are also being sought. They are to be offered to earn at least 200,000 roubles ($3,000) a month.   Over the past 24 hours, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine has demined an area of 396 ha and neutralised 1592 munitions and mines. Since the beginning of the war, 92,909 munitions and 583 kg of explosives, including 1964 aerial bombs, have been neutralised in an area of 17,000 ha.   On 4 May, Spanish law enforcement authorities – following a joint action by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) with the Prosecutor General’s Office and foreign partners – detained pro-Russian blogger Anatoly Shariy. In 2021 SBU charged him with treason and acting against national security in the information sphere. There is circumstantial evidence that he collaborated with Russian services. The activities of the Shariy Party were suspended in March. In 2021 Lithuania revoked his refugee status, granted in 2012...read more

The aggressor troops continued to shell and bomb Ukrainian positions, Kharkiv and Mykolaiv, and undertook offensive actions on various sections of the contact line, locally improving the so-called tactical position, but generally failing to achieve success and suffering losses. On 3 May in the afternoon they were to launch a massive assault on the Azovstal combine. Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov said the country did not have enough heavy weaponry to deblock Mariupol.   On the same day, rocket attacks took place in eight oblasts, mainly on railway supply system facilities – six traction substations in Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Lviv (three facilities) and Zakarpattia (in Zakarpattia the gas pipeline in Volovets was damaged). In addition, targets were attacked in Donetsk, Kyiv, Vinnytsia and Odesa oblasts (in the Artsyz region on the route from Romania to Odesa; on 2 May there was another strike on the recently partially opened railway bridge over the Dniester Liman). The Russian defence ministry announced the use of Oniks winged rockets, hitherto considered a weapon for destroying ships, to attack targets in the Odesa Oblast. This gave rise – after a pause of several weeks – to new media reflections on the depletion of the invader’s stock of precision weapons.   According to the Main Reconnaissance Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, a recruitment drive for contract service has been activated in Russia, targeting citizens of Siberia and the Far East. Recruitment quotas of 200 ‘volunteers’ per week are to be in place, with priority given to those with military experience.   The Head of the Personnel Board of the Staff of the Land Forces of Ukraine presented data on the course and prospects of mobilization. At the end of February and the beginning of March the manpower of the units was fully completed. Since then, the rate of recruitment has slowed down and is associated with the need for their ongoing replenishment. It is possible that mobilisation will continue after 24 May (the current one has been announced for three months), but no information has been provided on the army’s main needs in terms of military specialisations.   In the occupied Kherson Oblast, a ‘war for the Internet’ is underway. On 30 April, the aggressor cut off most Ukrainian operators and rerouted network traffic through its infrastructure, meaning it is routed through Russia and subject to censorship. Ukrainian telecoms operators are able to provide telephone services on 70% of the Oblast’s territory, but cannot maintain mobile internet access.   The head of Ukrainian military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, said that the invaders planned to create two provinces in the occupied territories. The first, called Taurida (which was part of the Russian Empire from 1802 to 1917), is to include the territory of Crimea and parts of the Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts, and the second – the Odesa Oblast, the city of Dnipro and parts of the Kherson, Mykolaiv and Donetsk oblasts. The Kremlin was yet to decide whether the occupied Donbas territories would be incorporated into Russia. Budanov warned that the aggressor wanted to orchestrate a humanitarian disaster to force the local population to accept aid on condition of accepting the new political reality. He also announced that the Russians were suffering from a significant shortage of personnel, and that collaborators – due to effective resistance and lack of popular support – were unable to manage the occupied localities.   The invaders exported a third of the grain reserves (about 400,000 tonnes) from the occupied territories in an attempt to reduce shortages in some regions of Russia. According to Kyiv, about 1.3 million tonnes of grain remain in the occupied territories, which is needed to ensure the food security of the population and to carry out sowing of spring crops.   On 3 May, Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada voted a final ban on pro-Russian political parties (their activity was suspended in March) whose programme and activities deny or justify Russian armed aggression, portray it as a civil war and glorify or justify those contributing to it. The parliament also adopted amendments to the law ‘On the foundations of national resistance’ allowing territorial defence forces (TDF) to carry out tasks independently in areas of combat operations. This shows that the armed forces need immediate support on the front line. TDF can cover sections where there is no intense fighting, allowing regular troops to be redeployed to where enemy attacks are ongoing.   The Verkhovna Rada was addressed – for the first time since the outbreak of war – by President Volodymyr Zelensky, who appealed to its members to be united and not to waste time on legislation of secondary importance. He stressed that they were MPs of ‘the greatest country at the moment’ and therefore should be guided by ‘rationalism and healthy nationalism’. In turn, in an interview with The Wall Street Journal, he expressed his belief that a ceasefire could only come about as a result of a meeting between the presidents of the warring parties and the formal signing of an agreement. At the same time, he stressed that Ukraine would never accept the frozen conflict and Russia’s territorial gains..read more  

On 21 March, Dmitri Medvedev, former president (2008–12) and currently deputy chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, published an aggressive and derisive commentary on his Telegram messenger account attacking the Polish government, the ruling Law and Justice party, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and Deputy Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński personally, and the Polish political elite for their policy towards Russia and its aggression against Ukraine. The text starts with a criticism of the ideas of ‘de-Russifying’ the economy and stopping imports of  gas, oil and coal from Russia, dismissing such ideas as senseless and costly for Poles. It also accuses “Polish propaganda” of “the most malicious, vulgar and shrill” criticism of the Russian Federation. Read full article on OSW.WAW.PL

Three weeks after the start of the war against Ukraine, the Kremlin’s political objectives have not been achieved. The resistance from the Ukrainian armed forces persists, the morale of Ukrainian society is high, and the very serious sanctions imposed by the international community on Russia are causing an economic crisis and the partial political isolation of the country. There are many indications that this situation has largely come as a surprise to the Kremlin, which has fallen victim to faulty analysis and forecasting. In this situation, the man responsible for the decision to invade, the Russian President Vladimir Putin, faces the challenge of which further tactics of action to choose. It is now difficult to predict further developments, as these will depend particularly on the level of Ukrainian resistance, the scale of Western support and the immediate effects of sanctions. Of the many possible scenarios, the most likely now seems to be that of either halting the Russian offensive once a political agreement to implement some of the Kremlin’s political demands has been reached; or continuing it for a longer period of time, leading to Russia’s seizure of significant areas (especially the south-east of Ukraine) and the destruction of key elements of its military and civil infrastructure, turning the country into a failed state.  The political objectives of the invasion The strategic objective of Russia’s policy towards Ukraine remains to bring this country under Moscow’s control. This should be understood as Moscow gaining a decisive influence not only on Ukraine’s foreign, security and defence policy, but also on its domestic policy, in line with the Kremlin’s interests. This objective is simultaneously an important element of Russia’s broader strategy aimed at weakening the West, especially the US & its closest allies, and destroying the post-Cold War political and security order in Europe. Since Russia’s policy to date aimed at achieving the above-mentioned goals has failed, and Moscow has moved further away from achieving them, the Kremlin has been faced with a choice of which strategy to pursue towards Ukraine: to increase pressure in a number of areas (political-diplomatic, economic-energy, information-cybernetic and military); or to attempt to escalate military aggression against Ukraine, in order to cause a political breakthrough which could achieve most of Moscow’s above-mentioned goals (for more details, see ‘Russia’s Ukrainian dilemma: Moscow’s strategy towards Kyiv‘). Events have shown that the Kremlin has opted for the second option, pursuing one of the most radical scenarios of aggression: a massive ground invasion combined with a campaign of targeted missile & aerial attacks, rather than a local escalation in the Donbas. Circumstantial evidence suggests that this was decided within a very narrow circle of President Putin’s closest associates in the leadership of the Armed Forces and state security structures several months before the invasion began. In this context, the diplomatic talks with the West (primarily the US) on the demands made in mid-December 2021 in the sphere of European security (for more details, see ‘Russia’s blackmail of the West‘) should be seen as a sham manoeuvre, and at the same time as a test of the West’s cohesion (although this test has shown that there are no significant divisions). Full article avaiable on OSW.WAW.PL

The military situation did not change significantly during the fourteenth day of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The Ukrainian Armed Forces held back the offensive in all directions, and the fighting took place mainly on the outskirts of the towns & cities under attack. According to Kyiv, the Russian army will mobilise reserves it has at its permanent locations and move more units into Ukraine. The Ukrainians have emphasised the important role Belarus has played in securing the logistics of the attack. In the Polessie direction, most clashes are taking place in the vicinity of Kyiv, and the forces prepared to defend the city remain ready to repel any possible strike. On 9 March, Russian troops regrouped to attack the capital and rotate their sub-units on the front line, which the Ukrainians took advantage of to launch attacks on Borodianka and Makariv. This assault ended with the opponent suffering some losses, but did not change the occupied positions. South-west of Kyiv, the aggressor’s troops continued their offensive actions in the Fastiv region, but the defenders were apparently able to repel the attack on Fastiv town. In the Severny direction, the main battles are taking place on the north-eastern outskirts of Kyiv and in the town of Brovary. One of the invaders’ battalion tactical groups (BTGs) organised a crossing of the Trubizh River (the left tributary of the Dnieper) to block the E95 route (the main exit road from Kyiv to the northeast) 10 km from the capital’s borders. Particularly heavy clashes took place on the outskirts of Brovary. A Russian attack near the villages of Bohdanivka and Velyka Dymerka (30 km north-east of Kyiv’s city centre) was halted. Due to the losses suffered near Chernihiv, the aggressor engaged a reserve BTG from the 55th Mechanised Brigade of the 41st Combined Arms Army of the Central Military District. The towns of Sumy, Okhtyrka and Trostsyanets were bombed once again. All roads in the direction of Sumy and Trostsyanets were blocked due to the movement of the invader’s columns. In the Slobodka direction, the Russian forces created a border along the Severodonetsk-Sumy line, from where operations are being launched westward to the line of the Dnieper and in the Kharkiv region. Particularly fierce fighting is taking place around the latter: the Russians have continued bombing and artillery fire, but the Ukrainian army regained full control of the town of Derhachi which borders it from the north. In the south, the aggressor expanded its attack zone to the west of Izyum (which was almost completely destroyed) up to the villages of Petrivske and Hrushuvakha. In the Donetsk direction, Russian forces (numbering up to 7 BTGs) are continuing their efforts to push the Ukrainian forces to the western borders of Luhansk oblast and the northern borders of Donetsk oblast. After regrouping, they resumed their attacks on Severodonetsk and Rubizhne, and after taking control of the Starobelskiy region, they reached the town of Svativ (55 km north of Severodonetsk). Fearing encirclement, the defenders pulled out from the front line and retreated westwards. In Donetsk oblast, after partially reaching the border with Zaporizhzhia oblast, the aggressor moved its forces northwards and started firing at the villages north of Horlivka; fighting also took place in Maryinka (30 km west of Donetsk). In the vicinity of the besieged city of Mariupol, the most severe clashes took place along the ‘green corridors’, intended for the evacuation of the population. In the Taurida direction, the line of the offensive has begun to move north. The aggressor’s troops were halted in Novovorontsivka on the right bank of the Dnieper, 60 km south-east of their target, the city of Kryvyi Rih. In the Zaporizhzhia region, the invaders reached Rozivka, 45 km north-west of Mariupol. Mykolaiv remains encircled, and Russian forces have occupied the northern districts of the city. To its northwest, the Ukraine Armed Forces have designated a new defence direction, the Southern Buzhany. Ukrainian troops are still holding back the Russians in the vicinity of Voznesensk; a Russian attempt to cross the Boh River failed, which forced them to stop their move towards the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant. Read more...